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Abstract.  – It is argued that the supervisory control of complex industrial
processes having a potential for serious consequences in case of accidents re-
quires careful consideration of the allocation of decision making between the
three main agents of control; namely the designer, the operator and the
automatic control system.  In particular, it is advocated that, instead of con-
tinuing their efforts to make their preplanning of responses and countermea-
sures more and more complete and thus restrict the operators' own initiative,
designers should take advantage of modern information technology to make
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available to the operators their conceptual models and their processing re-
sources so as to allow the operators to function as their extended arm in
coping with the plant.  Such an interactive decision-making activity would
thus benefit from this simultaneous availability of the design basis, up-to-
date knowledge of plant status and accumulated operational experience.
Introduction
THE CONTEXT of this paper is automated industrial processes and the re-
quirements they place for providing adequate and timely support to the oper-
ating staff in connection with the tasks commonly associated with the "job" of
supervisory control.  The operators usually have little or no manual control
activities.  Thus what traditionally is called "hands-on process feel" cannot
play any important role and reliance must therefore be placed on the infor-
mation and manipulation facilities provided by the display and controls in-
terface to provide what the operators need to know and do in order to ensure
that the system operates reliably, economically and safely in the face of devia-
tions from "normal" because of disturbances, technical faults and/or inappro-
priate human actions.
In truth, the crew is part of a decision-making team which, in accordance
with the functional allocations of the designers, plays certain assigned roles in
dealing with the process.  Use of the word team reflects the fact that the su-
pervisory coritrol of such complex systems is actually a cooperative effort
within a group consisting of the designers, the automatic (computer-based)
control system and the operating staff.  This three-way arrangement arises
from the fact that the decisions of the designers are embedded in the auto-
matic system as well as the training of the operators.  Thus the prerequisite
for a successful cooperation is that the computer and the operators/users
have to be able to work together in a positive way by taking advantage of their
different and complementary information processing abilities and their differ-
ent knowledge about the system, the environment, the goals, etc. -,@,'his
means that the framework in which this cooperation takes place will/should
involve a dynamic allocation of decision functions between the "partners" with
appropriate feedback and communication facilities between them.
This paper will treat these issues using previously developed frameworks for
structuring the decision making process and for describing the associated de-
cision space and thus to a considerable extent the knowledge required.  Some
remarks will also be made about the critical problem related to operator ac-
ceptance of the team role.
Decision making
Figure 1-taken from earlier work (Rasmussen, 1976)describes a framework
which encompasses the various types of information processing sequences
that characterize a decision maker's (dm = human or computer) activities in
dealing with a problem.  These include the completely rational approach
where the (im "climbs up the ladder" on the left-hand side while observing,
making an identification of state, interpreting the implications and prioritizing
goals.  Thereafter the dm "climbs down the ladder" on the right-hand side in
connection with planning and carrying out the appropriate set of actions in or-
der to achieve or reach the chosen target state.
The diagram indicates as well alternate paths from the initiation of a decision
making activity to its conclusion.  For example, in situations which seem to be
familiar to the dm, shortcut paths can exist in the form of a large number of
association rules-e.g. IF xx, 130 yy.  It is these which form the basis for the
veteran or experienced dm's behaviour in dealing with the object system and
often comprise the expert knowledge which is acquired for building current
expert systems.
Thus while in the real world the rational type of decision making behaviour is
probably mostly restricted to novices feeling their way, much can be said for
forcing experienced users to resort more to this type of response through a
suitably designed display and (controls interface.  The reason for this is of
course that the repertoire of quick and effective responses is not all-inclusive
for every possible situation.  Thus, in their interaction with the system, op-
erators first have to be made to realize the inherent risk in a hasty response
and thereafter be supported in more of a knowledge-based decision making
sequence in order to solve their current problem,
Cooperative decision making
As stated earlier, decision making in supervisory control is a shared enter-
prise comprising the designer, the automatic computerized system and the
staff of operators/users.  Since the designer will not be able to foresee the
necessary control responses for all possible disturbances, he needs a repre-
sentative on site-the opei'ator(s)-who have to be able to take over in a compe-
tent way.  The operators' supervisory control task is indeed in many respects
a completion of the system design for the particular, perhaps infrequent,
situation being dealt with.  A,,, a consequence, the operator will need infor-
mation about the problem space underlying the design and the designer will
have to communicate this kind of information to the operator.  This can take
place through the system itself, i.e. by means of the information gathered,
processed and stored in the computer-based instrumentation andlor directly
through training, manuals and instructions.  The cooperative decision making
among operator, designer and computer will result in a complex communica-
tion depending on the extent to which the designer wants his representatives
on site to take an active part.
Figures 2a and b illustrate how the basic framework of Fig. 1 can be repli-
cated to reflect how a designer might intend two typical situations to be
allocated among the partners.  These are discussed in more detail later.  At
the same time, the diagrams indicate the various classes of communication
among them.  See also Rasmussen (1984a) and Sheridan (1982, 1986).  An
identification of such classes can be useful in deciding on appropriate
information display support.

Hierarchical decision space
Another important consideration is the decision context, the representation of
the problem space.  Rasmussen (1984a) has dealt with this in detail in his de-
scription of the different levels of abstraction and decomposition which a hu-
man may use to cope with the complexity of a technical system, depending
upon the situation and the phase of a decision task.
In the abstraction, or means-end, hierarchy (see Fig. 3), the low levels of ab-
straction are related to the available set of physical equipment which can be
used to serve several different purposes.  Models at higher levels of abstrac-
tion are closely related to specific purposes, each of which can be served by
different physical arrangements.  This hierarchy is therefore useful for a sys-
tematic representation of the many-to-many mappings in the pur-
pose/function/equipment relationships which represent the context of-and
are a necessary precondition for-supervisory decision making.  When consid-
ering a control task at any level of the hierarchy, information about the proper
function, target states, and answers to the question WHY, are obtained from
the level above, while information about present limitations and available re-
sources, i.e. answers to the question HOW, can be obtained from the level
below (Rasmussen, 1984a).
In the present context, we are in particular interested in those human func-
tions in man-machine systems which are related to corrections of the effects
of faults and other disturbances.  States can only be defined as disturbances
or faults with reference to the planned or intended functions and purposes.
Causes of improper functions depend
on changes in the physical world.
Thus they are propagating and are ex-
plainable-bottom-up in the hierarchy.
In contrast, reasons for proper func-
tions are derived top-down in the hier-
archy; from the functional purpose.
During plant operation, the task of the
supervisory controller-man and/or
machine-will be to ensure by means of
proper actions on the system that the
actual state of the system matches the
target state specified from the in-
tended mode of operation.
This task can be formulated at any
level in the means-ends hierarchy.
During plant start-up, for instance,
the task moves bottom-up through the
hierarchy.  In order to have an orderly
synthesis of the overall plant function
during start-up, it is necessary to es-
tablish a number of autonomous
functional units at one level before they can be connected to one function at
the next higher level.  This definition of functional units at several levels is
likewise important for establishing orderly separation of functional units for
shut-down and for reconfiguration during periods of malfunction.
During emergencies and major disturbances, an important supervisory con-
trol decision is the selection of the level of abstraction at which to consider the
control task.  In general, highest priority will be related to the highest level of
abstraction: first consider overall consequences for plant production and
safety in order to judge whether the plant mode of operation should be
:;witched to a safer state (e.g. stand-by or emergency shut-down).  Next, con-
sider whether the situation can be counteracted by reconfiguration of func-
tions and physical resources.  This is a judgement at a lower level represent-
ing functions and equipment.  Finally, the root causes of the disturbance are
sought to determine how it should be corrected.  This involves the level of
physical functioning of parts and components.  Generally, this search for the
physical disturbance is of lowest priority (not considering the role which
knowledge about the physical cause may have for the understanding of the
situation).
Thus, when a disturbance has been identified and the control task located at
a certain level of abstraction, depending upon the perceived situation, the su-
pervisory control task includes the determination of the target state derived
top-down from the operation mode chosen, and an identification of the avail-
able functional resources and limits of capabilities, established bottom-up in
the hierarchy.
All of this has serious implications for the design itself as well as the determi-
nation of the knowledge required by the operators.  In practice, system design
based on proven technology is largely an updating of previous designs with
little specific attention being paid to a thorough task analysis and/or other
special operator needs.  However, a formal design and/or one based on new
technology, such as advanced computer-based techniques, requires a con-
tinuous iteration between considerations of purposes, functions and equip-
ment in the means-end hierarchy (Rasmussen and Lind, 1981)-also as the
basis for defining the information to be made available to the operators to
support their allocated supervisory roles.
Content of designer-operator communication
The content of information to be communicated to the operating staff during a
particular abnormal situation depends on the role allocation chosen by the
designer for himself, the operator and the computer.  It depends as well on
the extent to which he is able to foresee the situation and make a detailed
analysis, the result of which he wants the operators to consider,
Before such complex examples of cooperative decision making are considered,
it is relevant to discuss the information which is needed by the operating staff
if they have to cope with situations which have not been analysed by the de-
signer.  This is an important case, since this information will also be needed
in other situations for which operating instructions are available, in order to
understand the responses of the system to a degree which enables the opera-
tors to detect and respond intelligently to the effects of their own--often un-
foreseen--errors.  Studies have shown that the information needed to control
execution of pre-established procedures is typically not adequate for error
detection and recovery (Rasmussen, 1984b).
The basic content of the information about the design basis which is neces-
sary to enable operators to consider the whole supervisory decision sequence
can be identified from the abstraction hierarchy.
An important basis for prediction of responses of the system to control inputs
in supervisory control decisions is knowledge about functional relations at
each of the levels in the hierarchy.  This includes knowledge of plant anatomy
and spatial arrangements at the lowest level of physical form.  At the level of
physical function, important information is the description of the functioning
of equipment, for instance, in the form of pressure-flow-rpm charts for
pumps, reactivitypower equations for nuclear reactor cores, etc.  Possibilities
at the level of more generic functions are phase plots for water-steam systems
("steam tables"), heat transfer characteristics of cooling circuits and control
strategies for automatic controllers.  More general characteristics in terms of
power and inventory balances will be typical for more abstract functional re-
quirements.  Finally, at the level of functional purpose, the production re-
quirements and the specifications of risk targets and limits for dangerous re-
leases are given.
This kind of information, describing relationships within each level of the hi-
erarchy, can be stated in rather neutral, or objective terms, and will in general
be immediately accessible in engineering manuals and system descriptions.
Such information as well as descriptions of the functional mapping upwards
in the hierarchy is typically related to established and well documented meth-
ods for engineering analysis.  This is not the case of information describing
the downward mapping which, represents the design decisions, i.e. the rea-
sons behind the chosen implementations.  This information is typically im-
plicitly found in company or engineering practices or is based on the de-
signer's personal preferences and seldom finds its way to the operators.  This
may be crucial for control decisions when overruling of a design requirement,
e.g. an interlock protection, has to be considered during critical situations.
Traditionally, much effort is spent in presenting operators with analytical,
bottom-up information about the system.  Only little attention has been paid
to the need for top-down, intentional information on reasons for the design.
To give access to such information, ad hoc advice facilities are typically estab-
lished in the form of technical supervisors on call and-in the nuclear indus-
try-"resident technical advisors" and "technical support centers".  This kind of
information should be directly available to the operating staff, probably in a
kind of "expert system" computer-biased tutoring system.
The lack of information on reasons may not be a problem in systems of mod-
erate size and risk levels.  For these, only the rather frequent operational
states have to be considered and the reasons for these will be immediately
and empirically known to the operating staff, since their effects are frequently
met.  This is not the case for large systems where safety specifications also
have to consider rare events.  In such systems, reasons for infrequent yet im-
portant functions may be much more obscure to operators and special means
may be required to make them understood.  The information can be objec-
tively stated, but it may be difficult to collect, once the design has been com-
pleted.  It is a frequent experience for operating organizations that questions
to system suppliers concerning their design bases are hard to have answered;
typically, minutes from project meetings have to be retrieved since the man in
possession of the knowledge has moved to another position.  Information rep-
resenting reasons for design choices, for production and safety policies in a
company, will have the character of heuristic rules which are ver@,,ally
stated, and an information base in the form of an "e)cpert system" and an "ex-
pert knowledge acquisition" program to collect such information may be a
useful tool for alleviating these difficulties.
Communication of what could be called neutral information related only to the
background for decision making-information which describes functional prop-
erties of the system and specifies the intended operating states without trying
to guide the decisions of the operators--can be considered as relatively objec-
tive and there will in general be no role ambiguity between the communicating
partners.
This is not the case when the system designer attempts directly to support the
decision process of the operators.  In high risk installations, designers will
analyse large sets of abnormal events to judge the adequacy of the design and
to preplan the necessary supervisory control actions.  Some of these may be
automated, some left to the operating staff as instructions, and the communi-
cation will no longer be the transmission of neutral objective facts to the op-
erators.  Communication is now between partners sharing the information
processing tasks of the decision ladder, and communication modes may in-
clude the total range from neutral messages, to advice, recommendations, and
instructions and perhaps to direct orders.  The information will not only aim
by its content towards a proper control action but also, implicitly via its form,
towards allocation of authority and responsibility.
Different communication situations appear depending on the mode of coop-
eration chosen for the partners.  Criteria for the role allocation may be related
to reliability requirements, to the resources and conceptual model available to
support the processing by the different agents, or to the actual system state
data accessible to them.  Thus the designer can choose to automate certain
protective functions and thereby take over one of the supervisory iub-goals; he
can choose to preanalyse certain phases of the decision sequence through use
of his analytical models and issue instructions to the operators; or, finally, a
lack of data can lead him to transfer his conceptual tools to the operators in
the form of facilities for interactive decision making.  These modes of role allo-
cation will be considered in more detail to formulate the communication re-
quirements between designer and operator.
Allocation of different sub.-goals. For large industrial installations, there are
some abnormal situations when necessary reaction times are so short or con-
sequences so serious that control cannot be left to the care of humans.  The
designer then analyses a representative set of scenarios involving events for
which a defining set of attributes, e.g. in terms of magnitude of measured
variables, can be found, together with a reliable sequence of control actions,
such as safety shut-down.  This control sequence can be executed automati-
cally, or operators (,an be ordered to follow emergency procedures strictly.
Formally, the designer and the operators will have to pursue different sub-
goals.  See Fig. 2A.  The designer takes on the task and responsibility to pro-
tect the plant by automatic protection, while the operators are typically given
an early warning that automatic actions may come up, and are left with the
supervisory control task of maintaining operation but within the envelope of
the automatic protection.  In this case, the designer and operators are cooper-
ating by pursuing separate sub-goals, and responsibility as well as compe-
tence are clearly defined.  The designer and the operator will be processing in
separate decision ladders, and communication of data or results for each
other's decision making will not be needed.
In most cases, however, the designer will not be completely confident about
his automatic system, and operators will be instructed to monitor that safety
actions are executed properly, and to intervene if this is not the case.  They
are here cooperating intimately with the designer in one single decision task,
and will need the whole decision background including reasons for design of
the protection system in order to judge properly when to override. (Mistaken
overruling of automatic safety actions is one of the major prediction problems
in safety assessments.)
In this way, a role allocation which formally and in principle is quite clear
and only requires simple designer/operator communication will, at a closer
look, require intimate cooperation in practice because the designer will not be
confident that the results of his situation analysis which he has stored in the
automatic system are reliable.
Allocation of different sub-tasks.  See Fig. 2B.  A similar situation is found
when the designer finds that certain phases of the decision sequence demand
conceptual models and processing resources which cannot be assumed to be
available to operators during disturbed situations.  A typical example is the
planning of the reconfiguration of the plant to cope with major faults.  The de-
signer will then define a number of typical events, in terms of, for instance,
small/large steam tube breaks, or small/large loss-of-coolant accidents.  He
will analyse the proper countermeasures and issue instructions labelled by
the event categories.  The diagnostic part of the decision will typically be left
to the operating team due to the variability in symptom patterns.
In this case, the designer and operator will be cooperating by sharing a task
and will, in turn, take care of different subroutines in the decision process.
This switching will take place at the standard key nodes of the sequence and
will imply exchange of intermediated results.  Operators are in charge of the
diagnostic subroutine, while goal priority and plans for action are retrieved
from a data base supplied by the designer.  The role allocation in this situa-
tion is far from clear.  If operators are asked to follow the operating instruc-
tions strictly, i.e. they are interpreted as orders, the function will be unreliable
in practice.  Events are much more varied than the stereotype categories the
designer can consider, and the resources available for countermeasures de-
pend on maintenance schedules and errors during repair, etc.  In effect, then,
it should be realized that instruct' ions are to be considered as recommended
practice which should only be used by operators as a basis for adaptation to
the specifics of the occurrence.
Again, the designer and the operator will have to cooperate within one sub-
routine of the decision sequence and, in addition to communication of the re-
sult of the data processing, the operator will need information about the as-
sumptions and preconditions of the designer's analysis, i.e. not only bottom-
up causal data but also top-down specification of reasons, in order to have
the necessary reference for judging the adequacy of the existing procedure
and the acceptability of his modifications.  To consider an operator only as an
agent for executing the designer's preplanned actions will be unreliable.  In-
stead, he should be considered to be the designer's representative on site, and
the role allocation to consider is that of cooperative decision making.
At present, there seem to be two lines of development.  One is a continuation
of the traditional less resourcedemanding technology which stores the results
of the designer's analysis in automated sequential control actions.  After
Three-Nlile-Island, for instance, there has been a tendency to advocate
"symptom-based" procedures instead of "event-based".  This means that the
diagnostic sequence also has been analysed by the designer and the results
stored in the system as a kind of "naturalist field guide" to carry the operators
through the diagnosis in a purely rule-based fashion.  Similarly, it has been
proposed to use the results of fault tree analyses from probabilistic risk as-
sessments to develop an "alarm analysis" which offers advice to operators
during disturbances from stored computer decision tables.  Both of these ap-
proaches run the risk of giving trivial answers in frequent situations and
wrong answers in rare events-and therefore can lead to a loss of operators'
confidence.
A fundamental design principle ought to be that consistent on-line engineering
analysis is used as far as possible, and that heuristics and hypothetical fore-
sight are only applied to supplement such analysis or to guide the order in
which analyses are performed.
The other line of development-and that advocated here-is to realize that the
modern information technology gives the designer the facilities to place his
conceptual models and processing resources at the service of operators,
rather than to continue the efforts to make the preplanning of countermea-
sures more and more complete.
Thus what is advocated here is a kind of interactive decision making where
designers and operators are mutually able to bring their own and their part-
ner's advantages into play.  The designer will transfer his conceptual models
to the operator in terms of an explicitly represented abstraction hierarchy to-
gether with his processing models for integrating measured information to
match the requirements at the different levels of the problem space.  At the
same time, the operator will be able to use up-to-date state information and
his knowledge about ongoing maintenance work and all the accumulated ex-
perience with developing operating practice.
Interactive decision making
The design philosophy where the designer is trying to communicate his con-
ceptual models and processing resources rather than his own analysis of the
actual state will be discussed with reference to Fig. 4. The figure reflects the
close relationship between the decision process modelled by the decision lad-
der and the means-end hierarchy.  During diagnosis via the analytical leg, of
the latter, the task is to identify the state of affairs at the functional level
which enables judgements of the operational consequences.  In the abstrac-
tion hierarchy, this corresponds to a bottom-up determination of the propa-
gation of the disturbance and requires an integration of measured physical
data into higher level states.  When these actual states have been ' judged
with reference to goals, planning of control actions is based on a top-down
identification of the functions needed and of the available equipment.  The de-
cision ladder structures the process into standardized elements which define
key nodes in terms of states of knowledge which are suited for communication
and transfer of processing between partners. Tle abstraction (means-ends) hi-
erarchy is well suited to identify the knowledge needed for the information
processing.
Figure 4 illustrates how the computer and the operators cooperate on the
(upward) analytical diagnostic leg of the decision ladder as well as on the
(downward) planning leg.  The basic role allocation is that the operator and
designer interact intimately during th(, different phases of the decision se-
quence.  Instead of communicating results of analyses based on hypothetical
data, the designer brings his conceptual tools into operation "on site" through
the computer.  The computer has the capacity and accuracy necessary to test
consistency of sensor data, to check correspondence with component charac-
teristics and basic physical relationships (e.g. "steam tables"), and to take ac-
count of mass and energy balances.  In addition, analyses of the data col-
lected during routine operations can be used for defining "normal states" of
the various functional levels for the different operating regimes to serve as ref-
erence for locating disturbances in the functional topography.  In this way,
the computer will be able to interrelate actual states and target states up
through the hierarchy.  In fact, it thereby performs a diagnosis in terms of
lo(@ation of disturbances in the functional topologies without being depend-
ent upon the designer's foresight.  The results can be displayed as neutral
statements of relationships up through the hierarchy without recommenda-
tions of actions or priorities.  It will be important to present results from such
key nodes in the analysis and to select content and form of displays which
allow operators to make crosschecks with their own judgement, to relate to
their empirical symptomatic data and to check hypotheses from such sources.
The choice of priorities in goals will be left to operators depending on their
perception of policies and available resources.  In such a system, the mental
load from data integration will be diminished but at the price of the extra task
of retrieving ihe proper display or asking the proper question to the data base.
Signals calling attention to the functional domain where changes have been
identified by the computer (functional alarming, Goodstein, 1985) may be an
efficient retrieval support instead of serving as an advice for action, as is the
intention for traditional alarm systems.
Judgement of resources is included in the activities in the downward planning
leg of the decision sequence.  Again, the communication from the designer
should be based on a consistent engineering analy@;is of intended functions
and on tools for on-line analyses of the available physical resources rather
than hypothetical analyses of abnormal states.  Frequently, several physically
possible solutions may be available, and the choice will be dependent upon
economic or maintenance experience.  For support of such prioritizing, an
"expert system" structure may be useful for the operating staff for recording
overall print experience. (Present "expert system" technology probably will be
more reliable in a planning task for ranking choices than in the diagnostic
task in process control.)
This means that the computer and operators will share the planning function.
A basic prerequisite for planning will be information on the operational state
and availability of equipment and functions, and computer support will de-
pend on adequate access to actual configuration data, e.g. actual state of the
valving and sw@.tching. If this is available, the designer will be able to ar-
range displays of the possible configurations of equipment for various func-
tions with indications of availability considering the maintenance states-
"success-paths" (Corcoran et al., 1981; Long, 1984).  Procedural support for
establishing higher level functions from choice of a proper success path can
be available from a stored library of instructions which will be labelled neu-
trally by functions, rather than by events.  For many such functions, auto-
matic sequence control (:an be incorporated if necessary with input of actual
conditioning information based on maintenance states from operators.  This
leaves the operator free to express the selected target states at different levels
of integration, depending on conditions see Fig. 4. Again, information from the
computer is in neutral terms representing engineering Lnalysis of defined
technical functions and not hypothetical situations.
Operator acceptance issues
It is important to realize that, in any given installation, the cooperation de-
scribed here has to be carried out over extended periods of time and with
shifting human partners.  In addition, things are never static; ri,,k manage-
ment decisions, regulatory edicts, market variations or even ordinary mainte-
nance problems can introduce changes in (sub)goals, recommended
/prescribed operating practises, etc.
A recognized issue in connection with the introduction (especially into an ex-
isting work situation) ol new technology (e.g. advanced decision aids) is the
"user acceptance" problem which reflects the degree of (mis)match between
the designers' intentions and expectations and the users' actual interpretation
of and response to the demands made on them.  Early studies by Mecherikoff
and Mackie (1970) indicate the strong effect on acceptance of inadequacies in
the innovational introduction process with respect to design factors (lack of
regard for the actual operational environment), cognitive factors (concerning
the actual operational demands) and training factors (degree to which the us-
ers felt themselves to be competent).
The success of a cooperative effort between people is dependent upon a com-
munication between them that is based on the following factors (e.g. Smith,
1979):
- predictability, in terms of a mutual understanding of likely goals and values +
cultural and social background;
- reliability, underlying social and moral tenets which govern the mutual obli-
gations between parties; -responsibility, a definition of each party's ac-
countability (especially if something should go wrong);
- role status, the "instantiation" of the above factors in the actual working re-
lationship;
- confidentiality, protection of own rights while (hopefully) respecting those of
the others;
- learning, a continual learning of and adapting to the behaviour of the others.
There is considerable interest in the information flow between the interacting
parties in the supervisory control context, i.e. between the operators and the
designers' computer intermediary and, in particular, how to reproduce an en-
vironment embodying the important I'actors for good human-human commu-
nication listed abov,-, again in the interests of promoting operator acceptance
of the designers' "knowledgeable artifact".
A sensitive issue pertains to the "pet,-r" relationship between the two parties
and, in particular, how advice or even criticism from the intermediary will be
received by the operators.  Not much consideration seems to have been given
to the effect of similar messages sent the other way.  However, use of a differ-
ent classification of information transfer might relieve the situation.  As indi-
cated previously, much of what the intermediary sends to the operator can be
labelled as objective/neutral since it is based on actual top-down or bottom-up
derived information about the plant which is validated and checked for con-
sistency by the computer whenever possible before being formatted into suit-
able information displays.
Alternate identifiers for the information transfer types are available which in-
tuitively seem to provide the potential for a more positive reception by the op-
erators if properly included in their introduction to and training on the sys-
tem.  For example, Sheridan (1982, 1986) uses terms such as PLAN, TEACH,
MONITOR, INTERVENE and LEARN.  In our context, EXPLAIN and QUERY
would also seem to be relevant.  In particular, the intermediary's ability to ex-
plain its own "deliberations" and "interventions" and "justify" its conclusions
is a critical item.
When discussing communication between Human operators and a computer
intermediary in the context of supervisory control of industrial processes with
a significant risk potential, it should be evident that a key word must be error-
tolerant (Rasmussen, 1985a, b).  This of course is true for other complex sys-
tems-administrative, banking, transport.  Acceptability will be enhanced be-
cause, when carried out in practise, an error-tolerant design will/should de-
fine for the operators the scope and bounds of their responsibility.  At the ex-
treme, the designer (through his intermediary) could manage operational
safety while the operators could function under this umbrella and optimize
production.
Conclusion
The approach to computer support of supervisory decision making advocated
in this paper -is to consider operators as being capable of taking on the
authority and responsibility for the decisions required.  Rather than continue
a development where designers attempt to preanalyse all abnormal situations
and to store their advice in computers, they should instead try to make avail-
able to operators their conceptual tools and use the capacity of computers to
perform on-line analyses of the available measured data.  Supervisory control
should be based as far as possible on consistent engineering analysis.  Heu-
ristics and hypothetical foresight should be used to supplement such analy-
ses and to guide the priority of choice and not to replace on-site engineering
analyses.  However, real life is not black or white; the real systems will have to
combine all the approaches.
When an information system contains a mixture of factual information, heu-
ristics and advice based on other people's foresight, credibility may be a
problem.  For the design of decision support systems, design criteria are nec-
essary for enhancing users' acceptance of advice and establishing the precon-
ditions for user-understanding of explanations and justifications.  A basis is
needed for establishing and maintaining cooperative attitudes towards a com-
puter intermediary.
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